- Introduction to the Economics and Law of Intellectual Property
- The Basic Concepts of IP Law
- IP and Monopoly
- The Economic Analysis of IP
- Welfare Economics Apporach
- Paragraaf 6
- Paragraaf 7
- Paragraaf 8
- Paragraaf 9
- Paragraaf 10
- Paragraaf 12
- Paragraaf 13
- Paragraaf 14
- Paragraaf 15
- Paragraaf 16
- Paragraaf 17
- Paragraaf 18
Please find pdf-version of the Introduction here. Please note that footnote numbering does not correspond. This web-page numbers per paragraph; the pdf numbers from 1 up.
Introduction to the Economics and Law of Intellectual Property
Intellectual property (IP) is concerned with the product of the mind, with intellectual activity transformed by custom and law into a commodity capable of being appropriated and therefore traded. Customs, such as those institutionalised in the guild system which effectively protected knowledge of products and techniques, over the centuries have come to be replaced by laws. Various types of law have achieved this transformation: tort (trade secrets), statutory law (copyright, patent, design and trademarks) and the law of contract. Without institutional protection, people’s ideas, creations and inventions would be a common resource available to the whole community. IP law is the main device that has been adopted in industrialised countries for offering this protection. Its role is to foster inventiveness and creativity, thus encouraging the economic and cultural development of society. The dual aims of IP law are to provide an incentive to innovation on the one hand and to encourage the disclosure of innovation on the other hand. This duality leads to a trade-off between incentive and access: the greater is the strength of the incentive, the less access to the resulting information, and mutatis mutandis. That trade-off lends itself to legal analysis of the balance of interests between different groups in the population and to economic analysis of the opportunity cost of one or another course of action.
In economic terms, IP law privatises public knowledge, creates scarcity where it otherwise would not exist and restricts access to information goods. It enables the author of an idea, invention or creation to control its supply and reap the reward to the human capital invested, thereby creating an incentive to produce. The reward may be a financial payment, recognition or another non-pecuniary return. Some creators and inventors, for example, artists may be less influenced by financial rewards than by non-financial ones. The essentials of the economic analysis of IP are the appropriation of rewards and the effect they have on market supply and demand.
There are several layers of economic analysis of IP. At the most general level, there is the economic case for privatisation. As with other forms of property, such as the private ownership of land, economists have long debated the economic rationale for property laws; the modern economic literature on property rights is an extension of that enquiry. The case rests on the efficiency of private ownership as a means of discouraging overuse of common property – the Tragedy of the Commons – and of encouraging investment to improve its productivity. Once property laws are established, the price mechanism working in competitive markets will then lead to the best use of resources. This paradigm is applied to IP: patents allow the inventor to appropriate the rewards of ingenuity, copyrights do the same for creators of artistic works, and trademarks allow producers to benefit from their integrity in maintaining the quality of their products. Through appropriability, the statutory protection of IPs fosters innovation and its exploitation by entrepreneurs, thus leading to economic growth.
Another layer of economic analysis is to be found in the law and economics approach to IP law, in which individual legal doctrines are analysed for their economic rationale. The underlying tenet to this approach is that the economic purpose of law is the promotion of social welfare where the market fails to achieve that effect spontaneously. The invisible hand of the marketplace is aided by the visible hand of the law.
Yet another layer of the economics of IP is empirical analysis. We emphasise this aspect in our choice of articles because we regard empirical evidence as an indispensable input to law-making. The trade-off between incentive and access to IP is seen in terms of economic costs and benefits and any conclusions about the desirability of IPs, or of particular features of IP law, eventually reduce to the quantification of those costs and benefits. However, despite a considerable body of empirical studies of the effect of IPs (almost exclusively on patents) there is no consensus about the impact of IPs on innovation and growth.
A final layer is IP as part of economic policy-making. This includes domestic competition policy and law and international agreements, such as TRIPS (Trade-Related IPs), which govern foreign trade. All these layers of discourse are represented in this collection.
As may be seen from the Table of Contents, the economics of IP is dominated by patents. Our personal research interests do not lie in patents; one of us specialises in copyrights and the other in trademarks. Moreover, one is an economist and the other is a lawyer by training. We think this diversity adds interest to the selection of articles and our way of looking at them. As the collection shows, there is a great deal more to the economics of IP than the study of patents.
The articles reprinted here are concerned only with the economic aspects of IP; they do not include legal treatments per se, though many explain legal details to the reader. The collection is intended for an audience of economists and lawyers. In this Introduction, we provide a basic overview of the economics and IP law that is needed to read the articles. We also reprint introductory articles that contain concise summaries of the law and economics of individual IPs (Besen, Raskind, Gordon and Bone, Kitch, Friedman, Economides). The book is organised according to individual IPs, copyright, patent, trade secrets, trademarks and the final volume contains articles on the role of IP in competition and international trade. In this Introduction, articles reprinted are indicated by the author’s name followed by the reference (in bold); the Roman numbers are the volume number and the Arabic numbers are the chapter numbers in each volume.
. Besen, S.M. (1998), `Intellectual Property’, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 2, London: Macmillan, 348-52.
. Raskind, L.J. (1998), `Copyright’, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 1, London: Macmillan, 478-83.
. Gordon, W.J. and Bone, R.G. (2000), `Copyright’, in B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume II, Chapter 1610, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 189-215.
. Kitch, E.W. (1998), `Patents’, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 3, London: Macmillan, 13-17.
. Friedman, D.D. (1998), `Trade Secret’, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 3, London: Macmillan, 604-7.
. Economides, N.S. (1998), `Trademarks’, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 3, London: Macmillan, 601-3.
The Basic Concepts of IP Law
The purpose of this section is to provide a basic guide to the leading features of the different types of IPs. Patent, copyright and trademark law is statutory law (meaning that it was enacted by the legislature); it is national law and therefore varies across countries. Other aspects of IP protection are civil and may be state law; passing off, trade secrets, standardisation and competition law fall into this category. In federal countries, such as the USA, statutory IP law is federal law. The basic international IP-treaties – Berne for Copyright, Paris for industrial property (patents, trademarks and the rest) – provide many of the standard features of IP rights, resulting in an elementary harmonisation. There are also several supra-national rights, especially within the European Union, where there now exist a Community-wide Trademark and a Plant Breeder’s Right, with a Community-wide patent not too far away. Patents are further `internationalised’ through a number of separate treaties, such as IPC (providing an International Patent Classification), PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty, providing an international application option) and, within Europe, the EPC (European Patent Convention, providing an harmonised granting procedure). International conventions strive to establish similar treatment for national and non-national individuals and enterprises within signatory countries and international and inter-regional organisations – the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the European Union – to seek to harmonise national law to promote fair competition and international trade.
Despite this diversity, it is possible to generalise about IP laws. All IPs embody a degree of monopoly; its strength can be usefully thought of in terms of three basic elements: threshold (what is needed to qualify), scope (the extent of coverage) and duration (how long protection lasts). These elements are summarised for the main IPs as follows:
Copyright applies to a range of literary and artistic works in fixed form. The threshold requirement for copyrightable works is originality. Independent creation is allowed by the scope of copyright law but the scope is subject to limitations and exceptions. The duration of copyright is 70 years after the death of the author (50 years for neighbouring rights) but moral rights have different time limits.
Patents apply to ideas for industrial products and processes. The threshold requirements for patentability are novelty, an inventive step and industrial application; the scope relies on interpretation and originates from the patent claims; `prior use’ provides a limitation of the patent right. The maximum duration of a patent is 20 years (under the EPC: plus 5 years for pharmaceuticals) and there are annual renewal fees.
Trademarks apply to products and services; they must be distinctive and not deceptive and there must be no earlier rights or multiple appearances. The scope of a trademark is determined by a test of (likelihood of) confusion, association or dilution. Duration is unlimited subject to 10 year renewal fees.
The threshold requirement for a patent is more stringent than that of a copyright: its monopoly is therefore stronger and its duration shorter; thus these elements are interrelated. The economic justification for this is to be found in Landes and Posner. As regards scope, this is generally laid down in statutes, which are revised from time to time to encompass new developments, mainly new technologies; copyright law, in particular, has been subject to many changes to cope with a succession of copying innovations and products. Patents now include biotechnology, algorithms and business methods; trademarks have been extended to cover colours and smells. Breadth of protection of the different IPs is a topic of economic analysis, especially in relation to patents. Although patent and copyright law have adapted to a host of technical changes and to economic, political, social and cultural change, they have not been able to absorb every type of development; there remain the so-called sui generis rights (meaning ones specific to particular items), for example Plant Breeders, Database and Semiconductor Chips rights. Legal hybrids between copyrights and patents also defy easy classification; according to Reichman this can result in the case of new technologies (for example, industrial design, computer chips and software and databases) in alternatively too much or too little protection under patent or copyright laws or in resorting to specially created rights.
Another way to generalise about IPs is to focus on the different functions that groups of rights have, namely:
- to encourage artistic expression and design: copyright, neighbouring rights, design rights;
- to encourage certain information technologies: copyright, computer chip protection, databases;
- to encourage technical innovation: patents, utility rights, plant breeders’ rights;
- to improve consumer information: trade names, trade marks, design rights;
- to protect against imitation: tort of passing off, misappropriation;
- and to promote competition: competition law cooperation/standardisation.
Within each group we can find common features. Thus, the duration and moral rights that characterise copyright and some related rights may be explained by the person-oriented character of these rights; the author’s copyright has the duration of 70 years after the death of the author (post mortem autoris). Elements such as limited duration, annual costs and compulsory licensing go with the innovation-promoting character of patents and other rights concerning technical matter. The unlimited duration of yet another group IPs has to do with their function in the process of communication, the transmission of knowledge and information, which is unlimited in time.
. Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A. (1989), `An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’, Journal of Legal Studies, XVIII (2), June, 325-63.
. Reichman, J.H. (1994), `Legal Hybrids Between Patent and Copyright Paradigms’, Columbia Law Review, 94, 2432-558.
IP and Monopoly
The monopoly conferred by IP law gives the owner (of a useful invention, a literary or artistic work, a branded product, and so on) the right to exclude other users and therefore privatises what would otherwise be public. In overcoming the market failure of free-riding, IP law thus creates market failure through monopoly. There is, however, some difference in the economist’s and the lawyer’s understanding of monopoly (Dam, Kitch). In legal terms, the strength of the monopoly varies according to the threshold, scope and duration of the IP, as indicated above. Copyrights are a weak monopoly because there could be legal independent creation of the same work; moreover, the author may well produce several works that are close substitutes. A copyright-owner is therefore a monopolistic competitor rather than a pure monopolist (MacQueen and Peacock). A patent is a much stronger monopoly as the idea (the `inventive step’) is monopolised, thus reducing the ability of a competitor to make a substitute good (Kitch, Dam). Trademarks and trade names are weak monopolies because they do not prevent the production of substitutes, they merely protect the identity of the producer. In economics, the concept of monopoly is defined in relation to the freedom the firm has to set its price or, alternatively, it is defined in terms of market contestability, which depends upon entry and exit costs; the number of firms in the market does not necessarily control either. In competition law, it is domination of the market that is the criterion for monopoly. In fact, `pure monopoly’, meaning a single firm in a market, is rare and anti-trust cases are far more likely to be dealing with oligopoly where a few large firms, typically producing brand products (often protected by trademarks and trade names), dominate the market and restrain competition and the entry of new firms. Measures of market concentration, such as the US Herfindahl Index, are therefore necessary in anti-trust cases.
Thus, there are differences in the economic and legal treatment of monopoly and between the effect different IPs have on markets in terms of the degree of monopoly to which they give rise. The concept of monopoly is therefore a controversial question in the economic analysis of IPs and also in relation to competition law.
Finally, it should be noted that economists regard one aspect of monopoly as beneficial, so-called `natural’ monopoly, which exists when economies of scale in production lead to falling average costs and to low or even zero marginal costs. Network economies of consumption may give rise to equivalent economic (and social) benefits. In these circumstances, which appear to be prevalent in the cultural industries and other information goods industries, competition by more firms would impose costs and therefore lead to higher prices. This may lead to legal exemption on the grounds that the public interest is better served by regulated natural monopolies.
. Dam, K.W. (1994), `The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law’, Journal of Legal Studies, XXIII (1, Part 1), January, 247-71.
. Kitch, E.W. (1986), `Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?’, Research in Law and Economics, 8, 31-49.
. MacQueen, H.L. and Peacock, A. (1995), `Implementing Performing Rights’, Journal of Cultural Economics, 19 (2), 157-75.
. Kitch, E.W. (1977), `The Nature and Function of the Patent System’, Journal of Law and Economics, XX (1), April, 265-90; Kitch, E.W. (1986), op. cit. supra note 10.
. Dam, K.W. (1994), op. cit. supra note 9.
The Economic Analysis of IP
In a comprehensive survey of economic theories of the whole field of IP, Menell distinguishes two paradigms: utilitarian and non-utilitarian theories. Utilitarian theories have as their objective the maximisation of economic wealth through innovation and invention in the long run, or, in the short run, the achievement of economic efficiency; these theories are applied to patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. Non-utilitarian theories stress natural rights and concepts of justice as the basis for IP laws and are particularly relevant to copyright and related rights. As these volumes are concerned with the economic analysis of IP, our selection for these volumes necessarily emphasises the utilitarian paradigm. The utilitarian approach is embodied in what is called for short Anglo-Saxon law, that is the underlying jurisprudence of the USA, the UK and those countries that inherited English law, for example, Australia, New Zealand, most of Canada, India and countries in Africa. This approach does not always sit comfortably with European countries and those on other continents that follow the European legal tradition of civil law. Moreover, the economic rationale provides only a partial view of some IP law, and this is particularly true of copyright. Menell provides a thoughtful survey of the non-utilitarian theories of IP.
The instrumental approach questions the need for IP-rights in the light of the economic functions they are supposed to serve, the incentive to create and invent and the stimulus to economic growth and welfare. Questioning the rationale of IP law has a long history in economics; the article by Hadfield surveys economic writings on copyright and patents by Smith, Bentham, J.S. Mill, Macaulay, Sidgwick and Schumpeter and the patent controversy of the nineteenth century is analysed in Machlup and Penrose, Machlup, David and Plant. The argument put forward in many of these writings is that IP law is unnecessary because market devices exist that protect invention and creativity; being first to market offers lead-time advantages to producers that in effect gives them monopoly power for long enough to enable them to appropriate returns and corner the market. Not every inventor or author needs IP law for encouragement and those who do not merely reap economic rents from it.
The case for the protection of information by IP law rests on the assumption that it cannot be kept secret or used to get a sufficient head start on competitors. Friedman argues that in the area of patent law some information can be successfully kept secret, though at a cost. Process innovations offer more scope for secrecy than product innovations, which may be subject to reverse engineering, but that does not mean that keeping secrets is easy. Mansfield believes that for both processes and products the odds are better than 50-50 that a development decision will leak out in less than 18 months, but that if it takes three years or more before a new product or process is developed and commercialized, there is a better-than-even chance that the decision will leak out before the innovation project is even half completed (see also Reinganum). The rapidly shortening life-cycle of new products raises the importance of getting a sufficient head start on competitors. If costs have to be recovered in a relative short period, other things being equal, the strategy of relying solely on being first to the market in order to capture the returns on the research investment becomes less attractive. However, it has been argued that in the micro-electronics industry, where product cycles have shortened dramatically, patents have become less and less used (Kaufer, Scotchmer).
Some economists, especially neo-Austrians, put their trust in entrepreneurial activity to find ways of appropriating the benefits of information in ways other than that of selling it directly to consumers (Palmer). Neo-Austrians hesitate to grant IP rights, although they are willing to codify such rights if they are the product of an evolutionary process of interactions among interested parties (MacKaay, Palmer). The question of whether patent and copyright law is redundant, therefore, depends on the ability of entrepreneurs to find alternative methods of internalising externalities. Palmer lists technological fences, tie-ins and complementary goods, contractual association arrangements and marketing strategies as means of internalisation. This way of economic thinking makes it clear that granting IP rights is not the only way of protecting innovators against free-riders and, even though the mechanisms mentioned above only limit the need for an IPs, economic analysis clearly raises questions about the proper range and scope of IPs.
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the different economic models used in the analysis of IPs.
. Menell, P.S. (1999), `Intellectual Property: General Theories’, entry 1600 in B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, US: E. Elgar.
. Hadfield, G.K. (1992), `The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective’, Copyright Law Symposium, 38, 1-46.
. Machlup, F. and Penrose, E. (1950), `The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, X (1), May, 1-29.
. Machlup, F. (1958), An Economic Review of the Patent System: Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Study Number 15, Washington: United Stated Government Printing Office, 1-86.
. David, P.A. (1993), `Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History’, in M.B. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee and R.A. Schoen (eds.), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, Chapter 2, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 19-61.
. Plant, A. (1934), `The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books’, Economica, 1, May, New Series, 167-95; Plant, A. (1934), `The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions’, Economica, 1, February, New Series, 30-51.
. Friedman, D.D. (1998), op. cit. supra note 5.
. Mansfield, E. (1986), `The R&D Tax Credit and Other Technology Policy Issues’, American Economic Review, 76 (2), 190-94.
. Reinganum, J.F. (1989), `The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and Diffusion’, in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume I, Chapter 14, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 850-908.
. Kaufer, E. (1986), `The Incentives to Innovate under Alternative Property Rights Assignments with Special Reference to the Patent System’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 142 (1), March, 210-26.
. Scotchmer, S. (1996), `Patents as an Incentive System’, in B. Allen (ed.), Economics in a Changing World: Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of the International Economic Association, Moscow, Volume 2, Chapter 12, Houndmills: Macmillan, 281-96.
. Palmer, T.G. (1989), `Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach’, Hamline Law Review, 12 (2), Spring, 261-304.
. Mackaay, E. (1990), `Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 13 (3), Summer, 867-909.
. Palmer, T.G. (1989), op. cit. supra note 25.
. Palmer, T.G. (1989), op. cit. supra note 25.
Welfare Economics Approach
Welfare analysis was applied to markets for information goods in the now classic article by Arrow. Arrow’s insight was that information is a public good; it is non-rival, as consumption by one individual does not reduce the amount available for another and it is non-excludable, because it is not possible to restrict consumption of the good to individuals who can be made to pay (as argued above, however, excludability may depend on the technological possibilities for restricting access). Pure public goods have both features. The terms `publicness’ or `quasi-public’ goods are frequently used interchangeably with the term social externality to indicate the presence to some degree of one or another of these features. Where they exist, private incentives to entrepreneurs are insufficient to induce investment because they could not recoup their costs from market revenues; free-riders would wait for others to provide the good so they can enjoy the benefits gratis (or at a much lower price). The public good nature of information implies that it is not fully appropriable: it is, as the saying goes, subject to market failure.
Market failure, however, requires careful definition. Within static welfare analysis, the underlying objective of society at any point in time (that is, for a given state of technology, consumer preferences and distribution of income) is assumed to be the maximisation of economic welfare; this is achieved through the efficient allocation of resources, which, according to Adam Smith’s `invisible hand’, is attained by a well-functioning, competitive market economy in which private incentives alone lead to maximum social welfare. Market failure occurs when they do not do so.
There are two distinct frameworks in welfare economics for analysing welfare maximisation: the general equilibrium model of Pareto Optimality and partial equilibrium model of Pigou – so-called Pigovian welfare economics. Pareto Optimality, the rule whereby welfare cannot be unambiguously improved given the existing distribution of endowments among individuals, is an ideal that requires general equilibrium conditions: perfect competition in all product and factor markets now and in the future, no externalities or missing markets and zero transaction costs. A Pareto Improvement is some re-arrangement of existing technology, economic organisation or laws that increases welfare for some member of society without reducing it for others; however, it is recognised as being virtually inapplicable in practice, since almost every possible rearrangement makes at least one person worse off, thereby raising the insurmountable problem of how to compare one person’s loss with another’s gain (the interpersonal comparison of utility). The concept of an actual Pareto Improvement therefore has been modified by the Hicks-Kaldor compensation test into a Potential Pareto Improvement, in which someone who is potentially worse-off due to another’s potential gain voluntarily accepts financial compensation as a `bribe’ in recompense for the harm and so consents to the welfare-improving change. The notion of voluntary side-payments is, of course, well-known to lawyers and it is no surprise that Posner places so much emphasis on the law being able to achieve this type of improvement. The judge and law-maker become the `visible hand’, guiding the economy by means of good law towards an optimum. The Chicago School thus emphasises the creation of conditions through the legal process, in which voluntary exchange can be fostered, improving the working of markets and the price mechanism’s ability to guide society to an optimal welfare outcome.
Within the static welfare paradigm, though, IPs have to be regarded as a `second-best’ solution, that is achieving a welfare improvement in sub-optimal conditions. However, it is frequently ignored that no move can somehow magically switch a second-best into a first-best Pareto Optimal outcome. The effect of IPs on markets is both an incentive one of encouraging innovation and creativity and a monopolistic one of raising the price of the work to the user and so reducing access – a simple and familiar trade-off of costs and benefits. The introduction of the IP can never be Pareto Optimal because it is a barrier to entry and leads to a monopolistic price; nor are the results improved by compensation to users, even taking into account that having more information goods is, generally, welfare-improving.
Pigovian welfare economics states conditions for partial welfare maximisation in one market regardless of what may be happening in other markets. This puts the focus on the failure of the price mechanism to fully reflect the costs of producing information (inventions, artistic creations and so on). In a perfectly functioning market, the marginal cost of producing units of goods and services by entrepreneurs (which is also equal to the average cost under constant returns to scale) is exactly recompensed by the market price, thus providing suppliers with their reward (normal profit) and the incentive to stay in business. When this equation of marginal cost and price does not occur, the market does not coordinate incentives to producers to supply socially optimal quantities of goods and incentives to consumers to ration their use. Where there are external costs and benefits from private production and consumption, prices cannot signal incentives to produce and consume the optimal amounts and there is under- or over-production and consumption. This is the principal source of market failure.
In Pigovian welfare economics the conditions for achieving maximum social welfare in a market are that marginal social (private and external) cost should equal marginal social benefit and, as this equilibrium cannot be achieved through private incentives, there is a case for government intervention to alter private incentives so as to achieve equilibrium: a subsidy (in the case of unpriced benefits) or a tax (in the case of unpriced costs) or a regulatory intervention, such as IP law. In extreme cases, markets do not develop at all and these are so-called `missing markets’; such situations could occur because the transaction costs of organising a market are too high to make it worthwhile, for example, when there are a large number of small-scale users (Gordon). In all these cases, the government or other institution (copyright collecting societies are examples) may organise the collection of payment to simulate a market.
. Arrow, K.J. (1962), `Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’, in: The Rate and Direction of Economic Activity: Economic and Social Factors, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Series, Princeton.
. Posner, R. (1992), Economic Analysis of the Law, 4th edition, Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company.
. Gordon, W.J. (1982), `Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors’, Columbia Law Review, 82 (8), December, 1600-657.
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